[Below is the full text of the redacted memo upon which
Jason Vest’s April 20 article prepared for the Association of Alternative
Newsweeklies (AAN) is based. AAN’s original intention was to withhold the
release of the full memo, as it includes a section with new and useful leads on
corruption in the United Nations Oil-For-Food Program that Jason Vest was
working on developing as a separate story. However, given the high degree of
reader interest and number of media queries the current story has generated, we
have decided to go ahead and release the memo. It was originally sent as an
e-mail and was received by Vest with the headers redacted.– Editor]
[REDACTED],
[REDACTED]
I want to
emphasize: As great as the problems we face, and the criticisms back home, and
mindful of the sacrifice that almost 600 Americans have made, what we have
accomplished in Iraq is worth it. While Iraqis joke, “Americans go home — and
take us with you.” The gratitude which they express is sincere and unsolicited,
and not limited to a single political class. The political bickering back in
the United States has worried Iraqis, who fear that a Kerry victory will mean
an American withdrawal, short-term civil war, and long-term empowerment of the
most radical elements of society throughout the Islamic world. Nevertheless,
several Iraqi political movements have begun reaching out to Senate Democrats
to keep their bases covered.
I have
conflicting impressions of where Iraq is going. It is easy to see progress in
Baghdad. Driving from Jadriya to Mansour around 7 p.m. on March 4, shops were
bustling. Women and girls, some with hair covered and other not, crowded shops
selling the latest fashions from Italy via Lebanon, cell phones and electrical
gadgets, fancy shoes, and cell phones. Baghdadis are out and about, looking
more self-assured. Gone is the confusion that permeated Iraqi society in the
aftermath of Saddam’s fall. Shwarma and ice cream shops do a booming business,
and families patronize restaurants. Twenty-somethings and teenagers meet in
internet cafes. The internet cafes that we see from the roadside on the main
streets are just the tip of the iceberg; many mahalla have their own internet
cafes set off in alcoves off side streets. Even in poorer areas like Baghdad
al-Jadida, new plastic signs plaster the sides of buildings. Pundits and others
harp on lack of security, but shopkeepers pile electrical appliances, clothes,
bicycles, and other goods on the street. New cars crowd the street, as well as
older models long forbidden (Saddam used to forbid cars of a certain year from
entering Baghdad). Car dealerships continue to open around the city. Traffic
police go through the motions, but remain too fearful to enforce regulations.
Street lights
function irregularly and traffic lights not at all, but private investors have
brought in generators so that shops can function after dark. Electricity in
Baghdad is fluctuating between three hours on and off, in rotation, and four
hours on and off. There is no consistency. Despite assurances to the contrary,
neither the CPA nor the Ministry of Electricity publishes a schedule of power
cuts and rotations. It is now starting to get hot. I hope that the Ministry of
Electricity will be ready for the summer. You can’t run an air conditioning unit
on a household generator, and the demand this year will be greater than ever
before because of the influx of new appliances. If we are basing our goal on
last year’s figures, we are going to come out flat.
Despite the
progress evident in the streets of Baghdad, much of which happens despite us
rather than because of us, Baghdadis have an uneasy sense that they are heading
toward civil war. Sunnis, Shi’a, and Kurds professionals have say that they
themselves, friends, and associates are buying weapons fearing for the future.
CPA is ironically driving the weapons market: Iraqi police sell their “lost”
U.S.-supplied weapons on the black market; they are promptly re-supplied.
Interior ministry weapons buy-backs keep the price of arms high.
The frequent
explosions, many of which are not reported in the mainstream media, are a
constant reminder of uncertainty. When a blast occurs, residents check their
watch. If it’s on the hour, chances are that it’s a controlled explosion
destroyed confiscated ordinance. The explosions are frequent. Twice in recent
days, nearby explosions woke me up. I was staying with friends on the opposite
side of the Mansour district when a loud explosion rattled the windows —
apparently when rockets hit the nearby phone exchange. Given that I had gone to
sleep at around 3 a.m., it had to be big to wake me. (As an aside, most Iraqi
politicking occurs between 9 p.m. and 3 a.m., and so if CPA bases its cables on
Governing Council meetings and an occasional dinner with primary actors, it is
missing a great deal). This morning, I heard a loud blast at 8:40 a.m. My
guards told me I slept through an explosion a bit earlier.
We have made
the most progress in Baghdad; the south may be calm, but it seems the calm
before the storm. Iranian money is pouring in. British policy is to not rock
the boat, and so they do nothing that may result in confrontation. This is a
mistake. We are faced with an Iranian challenge. Whether Iranian activities are
sanctioned or not by the Iranian actors with which the State Department likes
to do business should be moot, since those Iranians who offer engagement lack
the power to deliver on their promises. In Bosnia and Afghanistan, we were
likewise challenged by the Iranians. In both cases, the Iranians promised their
intentions were benign. In Bosnia, we rolled up the Qods Force anyway, and
Bosnia has remained pro-Western in its orientation. In Afghanistan, we wrung
our hands and did little, worried that the Iranians might respond to
confrontation as if we did anything to enforce our word. This projected
weakness. Today, Iran holds as much influence over Western Afghanistan than at
any time since after the Anglo-Persian War of 1857. That said, I do not think
that a deliberate bombing such as we saw in Karbala or Khadimiya will be the
trigger for a civil war. Rather, I worry about deeper conflicts that revolve
around patronage and absolutism. Bremer has encouraged re- centralization in
Iraq because it is easier to control a Governing Council less than a kilometer
away from the Palace rather than 18 different provincial councils who would
otherwise have budgetary authority. The net affect, however, has been
desperation to dominate Baghdad, and an absolutism borne of regional isolation.
The interim constitution moves things in the right direction, but the
constitution is meaningless if we are not prepared to confront challenges.
Throughout
Iraq, we are handicapped by our security bubble. Few in CPA- Baghdad get out of
the Green Zone anymore, at least outside the normal business of going to their
respective ministries, etc. Most drivers work during the day, but not in the
evening hours when Baghdad is most alive. The U.S. Government has spent
millions importing sport utility vehicles which are used exclusively to drive
the kilometer and a half between the Convention Center and the Palace. We would
have been much better off with a small fleet of used cars, and a bicycle for
every Green Zone resident.
CPA’s
isolation will get worse with the transfer to the State Department. The job of
Regional Security Officers [RSOs] is to ensure safety and minimize risk. In the
view of most RSOs, the best assurance for the safety is to not leave the Green
Zone. This is the same policy which the British now apply for their CPA
personnel. The irony is that the Green Zone is less than secure. Despite the
success of the Information Collection Program in rolling up Baathist and Salafi
cells targeting Americans, large concentrations of Americans and Brits do make
tempting artillery targets. While managing the risk from the Baathist remnants,
we may leave ourselves vulnerable to other risks. Our screening for Iranian
agents and followers of Muqtada al-Sadr is inconstant at best. The isolation is
two-sided: Iraqis realize that the entrances to the Green Zone are under
surveillance by bad-guys, and they also fear that some of the custodial staff
note of who comes and goes. No one prevents people from entering the parking
lot outside the checkpoint to note license plate numbers of “collaborators.”
Perhaps the paranoia is justified, perhaps it is not. But, the net effect is
the same, as a segment of Iraqi society seeks to avoid meeting Americans
because they fear the Green Zone.
The use of
Personal Security Details [PSDs] also handicaps out ability to report on
certain key trends, especially in the south and south- central. PSDs are
necessary for protection, but they hamper communication with ordinary people.
It is ingrained in the Iraqi psyche to keep a close hold on their own thoughts
when surrounded by people with guns. Even those willing to talk to Americans
think twice, since American officials create a spectacle of themselves, with
convoys, flak jackets, and fancy SUVs. No one in Hilla, Nasriya, or Basra can
surreptitiously complain, for example, about Iranian influence to Americans or
British officials in CPA-SC or CPA-S when they feel that all eyes — including
those of people reporting to the Iranians — are watching them. Likewise, no one
in Baquba can complain of the presence of Baathis when they feel that
Americans’ ability to be inconspicuous may bring them personal harm. Iraqis
fear entering the headquarters of provincial CPA offices when they perceive, as
in the north, that many of the guards and translators report to regional
oligarchs.
How to balance
out the need for security with the need to get an accurate on-the-ground
report? We need to send out people to rove and who approach the streets with a
fresh outlook. It may not look pretty on an organizational chart, but it works.
We have people in OSD who speak Farsi and/or Arabic but who are preventing from
even visiting. There is an unfortunate trend inside the Pentagon where those
who can write a good memo are punished by being held back from the field,
despite the fact that three weeks’ experience could bolster their ability to
serve the Pentagon hierarchy and write an informed memo, position paper, or
answer accurately a snowflake. Three weeks is enough to get a sense of the lay
of the land, especially for those whose language ability is far better than
mine. We have all heard that the job of an OSD desk officer is to sit at our
desks, in case we are needed on any particular day. More often than not, we sit
idle, even when superiors tell others we are busy. OSD harms itself, and its
constituent members’ individual credibility when it defers all real world
experience to others. There is not a single person I know working in OSD who
have any other goal than to serve the best they can. Some people have chosen
not to go to Iraq for reasons that are known only to them, but others very much
want to come to Iraq, but are prevented by superiors who have misinformed
leadership that people want to stay put. This is simply not true, and is a
factor in the poor morale which afflicts the Pentagon.
Allowing
reporting outside the compartmentalization which both the State Department and
CPA crave would not compromise security. There is security in anonymity when
not tied to a specific area. In my case, outside of Iraqi Kurdistan, I need not
fear being recognized on the street. Unlike many members of our provincial
governorate teams, I do not let the mayors and governors I visit put me on
local television. When the television cameras appear, I tell the governor or
mayor that I cannot appear. Not only does this increase my own security but is
also creates a bit of a mystique which allows me to better function in the eyes
of some Iraqi officials. Ironically, allowing a portion of political officers
to roam would not create any more administrative chaos as that which already
exists. One CPA official, who will remain anonymous, drew an apt metaphor:
Watching CPA handle an issue is like watching six-year-olds play soccer.
Someone kicks the ball, and one hundred people chase after it (hoping to be
noticed), without a care as to what else happens on the field.
On a
micro-level, avoiding the media is my way of addressing what I see as a failure
in our strategic communication, which tends to promote American individuals
above Iraqis. Iraqis present at the 4 a.m. conclusion of the Governing Council
deliberations on the interim constitution were mocking Dan Senor’s request that
no one say anything to the press until the following afternoon. It was obvious
to all that an American wanted to make the announcement and so take credit. Our
lack of honesty in saying as much annoyed the Iraqis. Iraqi politicians are
savvy enough to understand political posturing, but resent the condescension of
our press operation. The resulting press, not only in al-Mutamar and -az-Zaman,
but also in The New York Times and The Washington Post focused on Iraqis, and
not on U.S. actors. It is what we should have been aiming for all along.
The interim
constitution has been quite a success. I can be quite cynical about most Iraqi
politicians, but I do think that it’s hard to not give Ahmed Chalabi credit for
getting the deal we got. When I see the results of his maneuvering and
coalition building, I wonder how much farther we could have gotten if so many
in the U.S. government had not sought to undermine him at every possible
opportunity. Of course we could have gotten a better deal had we come in and
used our momentum, but the importance of momentum in international relations is
something neither the interagency process, nor the CPA, nor the Pentagon fully
grasps. If they did, we would not waste time changing “happy” to “glad”
oblivious to the fact that Iraq does not operate on Washington time.
I had dinner
with Chalabi the evening after the constitution was announced, after he
returned from a visit to Khadimiya (the evening before the bombing). He was
extremely happy with the deal Iraqi liberals and the United States got.
Then again, as
I wrote in a memo earlier this week to some of you, the interim constitution is
just an exercise in Governing Council and CPA masturbation if not enforced. The
fact that we do nothing to roll up Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi which is running
around Najaf, arresting and torturing people, and trying Iraqis before their
own kangaroo courts signals to Iraqis that we lack seriousness. It also
telegraphs weakness not only to Muqtada al-Sadr, but also to others who realize
they cannot win legitimacy through the ballot box, and therefore will seek to
grab it through violence. Yes, we would have violence for two or three days after
arresting Muqtada (whom, after all, has had murder charges leveled against him
by an Iraqi prosecutor), but that would subside. Since so many of us have gone
through it, allow me a metaphor to the small pox vaccine: Getting the vaccine
results in a pustule which is unpleasant, but the vaccine also prevents the
potential of thousands of other pustules. Arresting Muqtada would signal
weakness, and would make other populist leaders think twice.
Our failure to
promote accountability has hurt us. If we fail to fire corrupt ministers, we
promote an air of unaccountability. Bremer’s less than subtle threats have
aggravated the situation. Whenever Bremer repeats that he has the power to veto
what he does not like, he gives a green light for Governing Council members to
pursue their most populist demands, knowing they can build constituency without
ever having to face the consequences.
Iraqis
politicians, ordinary Iraqis, and U.S. contractors have the sense that Bremer’s
goal is to leave Iraq with his reputation intact. He therefore hesitates to
take tough but necessary decisions, instead hoping to foist them onto his
successor or international organizations. Success should not be seen as the
state of Iraqi on June 30, but rather the state of Iraq on July 31, September
30, or November 30. It is essential we transfer sovereignty to an Iraq built
upon the strongest possible template. We need to use our prerogative as
occupying power to signal that corruption will not be tolerated. We have the
authority to remove ministers. To take action against men like [REDACTED] would
win us applause on the street, even if their GC sponsors would go through the
motions of complaint. The alleged kickbacks that [REDACTED] is accepting should
be especially serious for us, since he was one of two ministers who met the
President and has his picture taken with him. If such information gets buried
on the desks of middle-level officials who do not want to make waves, then
short- term gain will be replaced by long-term ill.
We so share
culpability in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis. After all, we appointed the
Governing Council members. Their corruption is our corruption. When [REDACTED]
work to exclude followers of other trends of Shi’a political thought from
minister and deputy minister positions, Iraqis blame Bremer, especially because
the Governance Group had assured Iraqis that their exclusion from the Governing
Council did not mean an exclusion from the process. As it turned out, we lied.
People from Kut, for example, see that they have no representation on the
Governing Council, and many predict civil war since they doubt that the
Governing Council will really allow elections.
In retrospect,
both for political and organizational reasons, the decision to allow the
Governing Council to pick 25 ministers did the greatest damage. Not only did we
endorse nepotism, with men choosing their sons or brothers-in-law; but we also
failed to use our prerogative to shape a system that would work. It is true
that several Governing Council members have real constituencies, for example,
[REDACTED], but what we ignore is that these constituencies are not based
on ideology, but rather on the muscle of their respective personal militias and
the patronage which we allow them to bestow. We have bestowed approximately
$600 million upon the Kurdish leadership, in addition to the salaries we pay,
in addition to the USAID projects, in addition to the taxes we have allowed
them to collect illegally. I spent the night of March 3 and morning of March 4
watching The Godfather trilogy on DVD with an Iraqi Kurdish contact who had
ridiculed me for never having before seen any of the films. The entire evening
was spent discussing which Iraqi Kurdish politicians represented which
character. It is telling that it’s remarkably easy to do — it was even easy to
identify [REDACTED] in the film.
Patronage and
oligarchy are the same the world over. Abdul Aziz Hakim receives support from
the Iranian government, which long was his host. The ironic thing is that, with
proper funding of Iraqi liberals, we could have helped advance them much
farther than we did. It is a lesson the Supreme Leader understands in Tehran,
Shaykh Zayid understands in Abu Dhabi, and Crown Prince Abdullah understands in
Saudi Arabia.
It would be a
very grave mistake to transfer authority to the United Nations. Kofi Annan once
said that “Saddam Hussein is a man I can do business with.” Not only can we
expect such a tape to be aired often on Iraqi television, but also we can
expect further revelations that Kofi Annan was speaking literally and, not just
figuratively. I spent a great deal of time with Claude Hankes-Drielsma,
chairman of Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, when he was in Baghdad earlier
this week. Many of you may remember him from his service with the 1985 South
African debt commission, and as an investigator who exposed the Nobel
Foundation scandal several years back. He is currently serving as advisor to
the Finance Committee of the Governing Council, in which capacity he is
organizing the audit of the UN oil-for-food system. Already, the audit has
uncovered serious wrongdoing in banks, and discrepancies of billions of
dollars. Anger is rising at just how little Iraq got for its money under UN
auspices, when the UN oversaw contracts that inflated prices and delivered
substandard if not useless goods. While the Western press has focused on
officials like Benon Sevan who, according to documents, received discounted
oil, the real scandal appears to be in some of the trading companies which
would convert such oil shares to cash. For example, Sevan cashed his oil share
with a Panamanian trading company, which, it turns out, was controlled by
Boutros-Boutros Ghali. This scandal is going to run deep, and will likely erupt
prior to the U.S. presidential election. Senior UN officials know that an
independent audit is being conducted, and are not cooperating. It would be a
shame if it turns out we knew about this, and yet did nothing to ensure that
key UN and bank documents were not shredded. Regardless, to allow the United
Nations to again loot Iraq will be problematic at best.
A real problem
remains the lack of security over Iraq’s borders. I do not believe those up
high fully understand the problem. When I first returned to the Defense
Department in November, the first assignment I had was to answer a snowflake
about how we are securing Iraq’s borders. It came less than two weeks after I
was stopped by an illegal PKK checkpoint about 20 kilometers from the Iranian
border. I answered the snowflake honestly, but was told to elaborate on the
procedures in place. The problem was that no one was following procedures. That
CPA had a Border Enforcement policy is completely irrelevant. It is too easy to
say the borders are indefensible. After all, while sanctions smuggling did
occur, it is undeniable that a crumbling Baathist regime did better than have
we. There are military roads along the frontiers, even in mountainous terrain.
Infiltrators may not have nefarious purposes for entering the country — some
may simply want to go on pilgrimage while avoiding the excessive tax and
license fees which the Iranian regime charges. However, if we want to truly
secure the border, we need to deploy far greater numbers than we have now, jail
anyone caught taking bribes, and imprison any infiltrators for more than a year
to send the signal to neighboring countries that such behavior will no longer
be tolerated. [REDACTED] might be politely told that his job is as much to
reform the foreign ministry and set it back on its feet instead of just seeing
how much he can east at a succession of state banquets.
Lastly, before
I sign off, our diplomats fear using leverage. It is much nicer to sleep at the
resort [REDACTED] appropriated for his own personal use when you don’t have to
listen to him harp and complain. Likewise, it is better to keep [REDACTED] a
happy drunk rather than an angry drunk. If our diplomats and CPA officials feel
uncomfortable being bad cop, it is essential that people in Washington play the
role. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], for example, are much more compliant when
their checks are “delayed” or fail to appear. The same is true with other
Governing Council members. The key is subtlety. They will figure out the
connection on their own; they need not have it pointed out by Bremer or
Greenstock in a way that will cause them to dig in their heels.
If anything
significant occurs in my final week in Iraq, I will send it along, but
otherwise, thanks for putting up with my diatribes and large attachments.
This article appears in Apr 21-27, 2004.
