The following article was commissioned by the Association of Alternative Newsweeklies and is being published this week in print and online by City and many other alternative papers throughout the United States. Based on a memo from a US official who has worked in Iraq, the article was written by Jason Vest, a senior correspondent for The American Prospect magazine.
The memo writer — a US official who has worked in Iraq — begins by emphasizing the positive: the sincere gratitude of the Iraqis and bustling commerce in Baghdad. But he warns that the Coalition Provisional Authority is isolated by its “security bubble” and must be careful not to project weakness to insurgents and corrupt Governing Council members.
The memo writer, whose name was redacted in the text Vest obtained, also warns that it would be “a grave mistake to transfer authority to the United Nations.” He claims that an audit of the UN oil-for-food system has already uncovered “serious wrongdoing in banks, and discrepancies of billions of dollars.“
To read the full memo, click here.
As
the situation in Iraq grows ever
more tenuous, the Bush administration continues to spin the ominous news with
matter-of-fact optimism. According to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
Iraqi uprisings in half a dozen cities, accompanied by the deaths of more than
100 soldiers in the month of April alone, is something to be viewed in the
context of “good days and bad days,” merely “a moment in Iraq’s path
towards a free and democratic system.” More recently, the president himself
asserted, “Our coalition is standing with responsible Iraqi leaders as they
establish growing authority in their country.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย But according to a closely held
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) memo written in early March, the reality
isn’t so rosy. Iraq’s chances of seeing democracy succeed, according to the
memo’s author — a US government official detailed to the CPA, who wrote this
summation of observations he’d made in the field for a senior CPA director —
have been severely imperiled by a year’s worth of serious errors on the part of
the Pentagon and the CPA, the US-led multinational agency administering Iraq.
Far from facilitating democracy and security, the memo’s author fears, US
efforts have created an environment rife with corruption and sectarianism
likely to result in civil war.
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย Provided to this reporter by a
Western intelligence official, the memo was partially redacted to protect the
writer’s identity and to “avoid inflaming an already volatile situation” by
revealing the names of certain Iraqi figures. A wide-ranging and often acerbic
critique of the CPA, covering topics ranging from policy, personalities, and
press operations to on-the-ground realities such as electricity, the document
is not only notable for its candidly troubled assessment of Iraq’s future. It
is also significant, according to the intelligence official, because its author
has been a steadfast advocate of “transforming” the Middle East, beginning
with “regime change” in Iraq.
Subhead:
‘The trigger for civil war’
Text:
Signs of the author’s continuing support for the US invasion and
occupation are all over the memo, which was written to a superior in Baghdad and
circulated among other CPA officials. He praises Iraqi National Congress leader
Ahmed Chalabi, and laments a lack of unqualified US support for Chalabi, a long-time favorite of Washington hawks. (It
bears noting that Chalabi was tried and convicted in
absentia by the Jordanian government for bank embezzlement, in 1989, and has
come under fire more recently for peddling dubious pre-war intelligence to the
US.)
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย The author also asserts that “what
we have accomplished in Iraq is worth it.”
And his predictions sometimes hew to an improbably sunny view. Violence is
likely, he says, for only “two or three days after arresting” radical cleric Muqtada al Sadr, an event that
would “make other populist leaders think twice” about bucking the CPA. Written
only weeks ago, these predictions seem quite unwarranted, since simply trying to arrest al Sadr
has resulted in more than two weeks of bloody conflict — with no end in sight
— and seems to have engendered more cooperation between anti-Coalition forces
than before.
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย Yet the memo is gloomy in most other
respects, portraying a country mired in dysfunction and corruption, overseen by
a CPA that “handle(s) an issue like 6 year olds play soccer: Someone kicks the
ball and one hundred people chase after it hoping to be noticed, without a care
as to what happens on the field.” It is particularly pointed on the subject of
cronyism and corruption within the Governing Council, the provisional Iraqi
government subordinate to the CPA whose responsibilities include re-staffing Iraq’s government
departments.
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย “In retrospect,” the memo asserts,
“both for political and organizational reasons, the decision to allow the
Governing Council to pick 25 ministers did the greatest damage. Not only did we
endorse nepotism, with men choosing their sons and brothers-in-law; but we also
failed to use our prerogative to shape a system that would work… our failure
to promote accountability has hurt us.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย In the broadest sense, according to
the memo’s author, the CPA’s bunker-in-Baghdad mentality has contributed to the
potential for civil war all over the country. “[CPA Administrator L. Paul]
Bremer has encouraged re-centralization in Iraq because it is
easier to control a Governing Council less than a kilometer away from the
Palace, rather than 18 different provincial councils who would otherwise have
budgetary authority,” he says. The net effect, he continues, has been a “desperation to dominate Baghdad, and an
absolutism born of regional isolation.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย The memo also describes the CPA as
“handicapped by [its] security bubble,” and derides the US government for
spending “millions importing sport utility vehicles which are used exclusively
to drive the kilometer and a half” between CPA and Governing Council
headquarters when “we would have been much better off with a small fleet of
used cars and a bicycle for every Green Zone resident.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย While the memo upbraids CPA
officials — an apparent majority — who stay inside the Green Zone in the
name of personal safety, it also maintains that the Green Zone itself is “less
than secure,” both for Westerners and Iraqis. According to the author,
“screening for Iranian agents and followers of Muqtada
al Sadr is inconsistent at best,” and anti-CPA
elements can easily gather basic intelligence, since no one is there to
“prevent people from entering the parking lot outside the checkpoint to note
license plate numbers of ‘collaborators.'”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย Ordinary Iraqis also “fear that some
of the custodial staff note who comes and goes,” according to the memo, causing
a “segment of Iraqi society to avoid meeting Americans because they fear the
Green Zone.” It also derides the use of heavily armed personal-security details
(PSDs) for CPA personnel, saying the practice
inspires reticence among ordinary Iraqis. “It is ingrained in the Iraqi psyche
to keep a close hold on their own thoughts when surrounded by people with
guns,” the memo notes. “Even those willing to talk to Americans think twice,
since American officials create a spectacle of themselves, with convoys, flak
jackets, fancy SUVs.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย While the memo offers an encouraging
and appealing picture of thriving businesses and patrons on the streets of a
free Baghdad, it notes that “the progress evident happens despite us rather
than because of us,” and reports that “frequent explosions, many of which are
not reported in the mainstream media, are a constant reminder of uncertainty.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย Indeed, while boosters of the Iraqi
invasion delight in the phrase “25 million free Iraqis,” if the CPA memo is any
indication, this newfound liberty does not include freedom from fear.
“Baghdadis have an uneasy sense that they are heading towards civil war,” it
says. “Sunnis, Shias, and Kurd professionals say that
they themselves, friends, and associates are buying weapons fearing for the
future.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย The memo also notes that while Iraqi
police “remain too fearful to enforce regulations,” they are making a pretty
penny as small arms dealers, with the CPA as an unwitting partner. “CPA is
ironically driving the weapons market,” it reveals. “Iraqi police sell their
US-supplied weapons on the black market; they are promptly re-supplied.
Interior ministry weapons buy-backs keep the price of arms high.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย The memo goes on to argue that “the
trigger for a civil war” is not likely to be an isolated incident of violence,
but the result of “deeper conflicts that revolve around patronage and
absolutism” reaching a flashpoint.
Subhead:
‘Their corruption is our corruption’
Text:
Asserting that the US must “use our
prerogative as an occupying power to signal that corruption will not be
tolerated,” the CPA memo recommends taking action against at least four Iraqi
ministers whose names have been redacted from the document. (Though there may
be no connection, two weeks ago, Interior Minister NuriBadran abruptly resigned, as did Governing Council
member IyadAllawi.)
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย Also redacted is the name of a
minister whose acceptance of “alleged kickbacks… should be especially serious
for us, since he was one of two ministers who met the President and had his
picture taken with him.” “If such information gets buried on the desks of
middle-level officials who do not want to make waves,” the memo warns, “the
short-term gain will be replaced by long-term ill.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย Developing this theme, the memo
asserts that the US “share[s]
culpability in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis” for engendering Iraq’s currently cronyistic state; since “we appointed the Governing Council
members… their corruption is our corruption.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย The author then notes that two individuals
— names again redacted — have successfully worked to exclude certain
strains of Shia from obtaining ministerial-level
positions, and that for this “Iraqis blame Bremer, especially because the [CPA]
Governance Group had assured Iraqis that exclusion from the Governing Council
did not mean an exclusion from the process. As it turns out, we lied. People
from Kut [a city south of Baghdad recently besieged
by Shiite forces loyal to Muqtada al Sadr], for example, see that they have no representation on
the Governing Council, and many predict civil war since they doubt that the
Governing Council will really allow elections.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย Fanning the embers of distrust is
the US’s failure to
acknowledge that the constituencies of key Governing Council members “are not
based on ideology, but rather on the muscle of their respective personal
militias and the patronage which we allow them to bestow,” according to the
memo’s author. Using the Kurds as an example, he reveals that “we have bestowed
approximately $600 million upon the Kurdish leadership,
in addition to the salaries we pay, in addition to the USAID projects, in
addition to the taxes which we have allowed them to collect illegally.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย The memo also characterizes the
CPA’s border-security policy as “completely irrelevant,” going so far as to
state that “it is undeniable that a crumbling Baathist
regime did better than we have” in that regard. Noting that senior Defense
Department officials do not fully understand the nature of the problem, the
memo recommends that the US “deploy far
greater numbers [of soldiers] than we have now” to the borders.
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย The memo also criticizes the Defense
Department — in particular the Office of the Secretary of Defense — for
keeping potentially useful personnel in Washington. “There is an
unfortunate trend inside the Pentagon where those who can write a good memo are
punished by being held back from the field,” it says, adding that “OSD harms
itself, and its constituent members’ individual credibility, when it defers all
real world experience to others.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย The CPA’s press operation — headed
by Dan Senor, Bremer’s senior communications adviser, who is seen by many as
little more than a White House hack — doesn’t escape the memo writer’s
criticism, either. The press office, he says, has made a bad political
situation worse by “promoting American individuals above Iraqis.” In one case,
the memo says, “Iraqis present at the 4 a.m. conclusion of
the Governing Council deliberations on the interim constitution were mocking
Dan Senor’s request that no one say anything to the
press until the following afternoon…. It was obvious to all that an American
wanted to make the announcement and so take credit. Our lack of honesty in
saying as much annoyed the Iraqis… [they] resent the
condescension of our press operation.”
Subhead:
Pre-war concerns validated
Text:
By and large, the March memo validates many points raised by career military,
diplomatic, and intelligence officers before the war. For them, lack of
planning for post-war stabilization was a primary matter of deep concern, which
cannot be said for the Bush administration’s hawkish advocates of “regime
change.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย Among the more informed and
prescient in this camp is Retired USAF Colonel Sam Gardiner, a long-time
National War College instructor and war-games specialist who asserted in
February of 2003 that “the military is not prepared to deal with [Bush’s]
promises” of a rapid post-war transition in Iraq. Based on Gardiner’s
experience as a participant in a SwedishNationalWarCollege study of
protracted difficulties in rebuilding Kosovo’s electrical grid after NATO
bombed it in 1999, Gardiner made a similar study, in 2002, of
the likely effect US bombardment
would have on Iraq’s power
system.
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย Gardiner’s assessment was not
optimistic. It was also hardly unknown: not only did he present his finding to
a mass audience at a RAND Corporation forum, he also
briefed ranking administration officials ranging from then-NSC Iraq point man ZalmayKhalizad to senior
Pentagon and US Agency for International Development officials.
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย Despite repeated assurances over the
past year from CPA chief Paul Bremer that Iraq’s electricity situation has
vastly improved, the memo says otherwise, reporting that there is “no
consistency” in power flows. “Street lights function irregularly and traffic
lights not at all…. Electricity in Baghdad
fluctuating between three hours, on and off, in rotation, and four hours on and
off.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย “I continue to get very upset about
the electricity issue,” Gardiner said last week after reviewing the memo. “I
said in my briefing that the electrical system was going to be damaged, and
damaged for a long time, and that we had to find a way to keep key people at
their posts and give them what they need so there wouldn’t be unnatural surges that
cause systems to burn out. Frankly, if we had just given the Iraqis some baling
wire and a little bit of space to keep things running, it would have been
better. But instead we’ve let big US companies go
in with plans for major overhauls.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย As journalists PratapChatterjee and Herbert Docena
noted in a report from Iraq in Southern Exposure, published by the
Durham, North Carolina-based Institute for Southern Studies, the steam turbines
at Iraq’s Najibiya power plant have been dormant since last fall.
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย As YaruubJasim, the plant’s manager, explained, “Normally we have
power 23 hours a day. We should have done maintenance on these turbines in
October, but we had no spare parts and money.” And why not?
According to Jasim, the necessary replacement parts
were supposed to come from the Bechtel Corporation, but they hadn’t arrived yet
— in part because Bechtel’s priority was a months-long independent
examination of power plants with an eye towards total reconstruction.
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย And while parts could have been
cheaply and quickly obtained from Russian, German, or French contractors —
the contractors who built most of Iraq’s power stations — “unfortunately,” Jasim told Chatterjee and Docena, “Mr. Bush prevented the French, Russian, and German
companies from [getting contracts in] Iraq.” (In an interview last year with
the San Francisco Chronicle,
Bechtel’s Iraq operations
chief held that “to just walk in and start fixing Iraq” was “an
unrealistic expectation.”)
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย The CPA memo also validates key
points of the exceptionally perceptive February 2003 US Army War College
report, “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military
Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario.” Critical of the US government’s
insufficient post-war planning, the WarCollege report asserted
that “the possibility of the United
States winning the war and losing the peace
is real and serious.” It also cautioned that insufficient attention had been
given to the political complexities likely to crop up in post-Saddam Iraq, a scene in
which religious and ethnic blocs supported by militias would further complicate
a transition to functional democracy in a nation bereft of any pluralistic
history.
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย According to a Washington, DC-based
senior military official whose responsibilities include Iraq, CPA now estimates
there are at least 30 separate militias active in Iraq, and “essentially, [CPA]
doesn’t know what to do with regard to them — which is frightening, because
CPA’s authority essentially ends on June 30, and any Iraqi incentive to get rid
of the militias is likely to go away after that date, as sending US troops
around Iraq against Iraqis isn’t likely to endear the new Iraqi government to
its citizens.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย And then there is the problem of Iran. According to
the memo, “Iranian money is pouring in” to occupied Iraq — particularly the
area under British control — and it asserts it is “a mistake” to stick to a
policy of “not rock[ing] the boat” with the Iranians,
as “the Iranian actors with which the State Department likes to do business…
lack the power to deliver on promises” to exercise restraint in Iraq.
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย According to senior US intelligence
and military officials queried on this point, the Iranian influence in Iraq is both real
and formidable, and the US is, as one
put it, at best “catching up” in the battle for influence. But the officials
also added that pushing the point with Iran too hard —
either through diplomatic channels or on the ground in Iraq — would
likely be more troubled than the current course of action, possibly resulting
in armed conflict with Iran or a proxy
war in Iraq that the US isn’t ready
to fight.
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย Famously, Lord Cromer once described
Great Britain’s approach to
the Land of the Nile: “We do not rule Egypt; we rule
those who rule Egypt.” Compare
that with several statements made by the US official who
wrote the memo considered here. Of one senior Iraqi official, whose name is
redacted, he states that “it is better to keep [him] a happy drunk than an
angry drunk.” And he says of two other Iraqi leaders that they are “much more
compliant when their checks are delayed or fail to appear,” adding that “the
same is true with other Governing Council members.”
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย The attitudes aren’t much different,
are they? And yet sometimes, the most true and heartbreaking view is afforded
from the wheel of the mighty ship of state.
Jason Vest is
a senior correspondent for the American Prospect. His book on the current Bush administration and national security
will be published in 2005. This piece was commissioned by the Association of
Alternative Newsweeklies (AAN) for use by its members.
This article appears in Apr 21-27, 2004.
